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Intent to Use: A Failed Experiment?
By AMY B.

COHEN*

WHEN CONGRESS ENACTED the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988 1 ("TLRA"), it made the first truly radical change in trademark
law since the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946. By adding Section
1 (b) to the Lanham Act allowing applications for federal trademark
registration to be based on an intent to use the mark,2 Congress for
the first time provided a way to apply for federal trademark registra
tion before actual use of a trademark. Congress made this change to
bring United States law into closer conformity with the practice else
where in the world where use is not a prerequisite to trademark pro
tection. 3 Congress, however, did not go so far as abandoning
completely the long American legal tradition that bases trademark
ownership and protection on actual use of the mark in connection
with the goods or services the mark is intended to identify. The TLRA,
while allowing one to file an application based on an intent to use
("ITU") a mark, makes registration itself contingent upon actual use
within a set period of time after the issuance of a notice of allowance
for the intent to use application. Thus, there is not complete protec
tion until after actual use of the mark has occurred. 4 The TLRA is
Congress's attempt to straddle two positions: the American tradition
requiring use for trademark protection and the emerging practice

* Professor of Law, Western New England COllege School of Law. I would liKe to
thank Pamela Chestek, Western New England College School of Law (2000), for her
invaluable insights and assistance with this article. I also want to thank my husband and
daughters for their continuing love and support.
1. Act of November 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1994). This statute provides:
A person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good
faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce may apply to register the
trademark under this chapter on the principal register hereby established ... by
paying the prescribed fee [and filing in the Patent and Trademark Office an ap
plication and a verified statement, in such form as may be prescribed by the
Director.]
[d. at §1051 (b) (1).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 38-44.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 48-56.
683

684

UNIVERSIlY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

elsewhere in the world that does not require such use prior to ob
taining trademark protection.
This half-way position has created numerous problems and has in
many ways failed to accomplish the goal of bringing American law
into conformity with the rest of the world. While attempting to clarify
the definition of the term "use," it has instead created a morass of
varying definitions. Procedural issues have arisen as to the effect of an
intent to use application vis-a-vis those who oppose such applications
or those who use the applied for mark before a registration actually
issues. 5 The American position has also made it more difficult to de
termine who is entitled to use a mark and under what circumstances.
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether there are sufficient benefits
from this change in the law to outweigh the numerous problems it has
created. It is therefore time to re-evaluate the experiment with the
intent to use approach and consider whether Congress should either
turn back the clock to pre-1988 law or move forward toward a system
that is less based on use of trademark as the prerequisite to legal
protection.
Part I of this article summarizes the pre-TLRA history of trade
mark use and the changes made by the TLRA. Part II will address the
confusion that exists with respect to the meaning of "use" in a post
TLRA world. Part III identifies the procedural problems the TLRA has
created. Part N considers whether the ITU provisions of the TLRA
have achieved the Congressional goals for enacting the statute. Fi
nally, in Part V, an argument is made for serious re-examination of the
intent to use regime created by the TLRA.

I.

The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 and Its
Historical Background

A.

An American Tradition: Use of the Mark As a Prerequisite to
Protection

American trademark law has its roots in the English common law,
as the United States Supreme Court recognized in 1879 in the Trade
Mark Cases:
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to
the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized
by the common law and the chancery courts of England and of this
country, and by the statutes of some of the States .... This exclu
5.

See infra text accompanying notes 174-254.
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sive right was not created by the act of Congress, and does not now
depend upon it for its enforcement. The whole system of trade
mark property and the civil remedies for its protection existed long
anterior to that act, and have remained in full force since its
passage. 6

The Court further observed, in distinguishing trademarks from
copyrights and patents, that, "[t]he trade-mark may be, and generally
is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive
symbol of the party using it. At common law the exclusive right to it grows
out of its use, and not its mere adoption."7
In Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn,8 the Supr~me Court recognized as a
general proposition established by case law" [t] hat "the exclusive right
to the use of the mark or device claimed as a trade-mark is founded
on priority of appropriation; that is to say, the claimant of the trade
mark must have been the first to use or employ the same on like arti
cles of production .... "9 In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,lO the
Supreme Court again reaffirmed the common law requirement of use
as a prerequisite to trademark rights and recognized that the require
ment was based on a view that a trademark exists only to protect a
person's "right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation
and the good-will that flows from it, free from unwarranted interfer
ence by others .... "11 Reviewing English common law precedent, the
Court reasoned that since trademarks are intended to help identify
the source of particular goods and services, the English courts had
denied the existence of any property right in a trademark "except as
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with
which the mark is used."12 The Court concluded that the same rule
applied in the United States as well.'3
In United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus CO.,14 the Supreme Court
continued to adhere to the view that the common law based trade
mark rights on the use of a mark to identify the source of goods and
services; the Court concluded that a later user of a mark could con
6. The Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). For more on the history of trade
marks at common law, see Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical
Histmy of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK RYrR. 305, 310-36 (1979); Benjamin G. Paster,
Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK RYrR. 551 (1969).
7. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (emphasis added).
8. 150 U.S. 460 (1893).
9. Id. at 463-64.
10. 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
11. Id. at 413.
12. Id. at 414.
13. See id.
14. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
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tinue to use the mark based on its priority in a geographically remote
market because the later use would not be confused with the original
use of the mark. 15 In other words, common law trademark rights only
extended to the area where a user had achieved good will and public
recognition of its trademark as the symbol of that good will. 16
Thus, under the common law, it was important to determine the
first date and the geographic extent of a particular claimant's use of a
mark. Case law developed to define "first use" for purposes of such
common law rights. That determination was heavily based on specific
facts and circumstances, therefore creating inconsistencies and confu
sion with respect to such determinations. For example, there were dis
tinctions made in defining the necessary quantum of use between
marks that were inherently distinctive, or "technical trademarks," and
marks that had to acquire secondary meaning before they could re
ceive trademark protection. 17
15.

See id. at 103.
See id.
17. For example, in Kathreiner's Malz.kafee Fabriken Mit Beschraenkter Haftung v. PastDr
Kneipp Medicine Co., 82 F. 321 (7th Cir. 1897), the court found that a party's limited sales
over a three year period in the United States were sufficient to establish trademark owner
ship. See id. at 327. The court observed that it is not necessary:
[T) hat a trade in an article should be fully established, in the sense that the arti
cle be widely known .... It is enough, we think, if the article with the adopted
brand upon it is actually a vendible article in the market, with intent by the pro
prietor to continue its production and sale. It is not essential that its use has been
long continued, or that the article should be widely known, or should have at
tained great reputation.
[d. at 326.
In contrast, in Levy v. Waitt, 61 F. 1008 (1st Cir. 1894), the court considered a party's
claim to trademark ownership unsuccessful where the party's claim to priority was based on
sales considered too limited and the other party had engaged in more extensive use of the
mark after those initial sales by the claimant. See id. at 1012. The court reasoned,
[W)e believe no case can be found where, with intermittent offers of merchandise
bearing a certain name, with such long lapses on the one side, and on the other
the uninterrupted and innocent use of the same name for five years without ques
tion, and a consequent growth of an extensive and valuable business, the equity
courts have interfered in favor of the former against the latter.
[d. at 1010. The court thus denied the first party relief, concluding that they "had neither
made any appropriation, nor fixed in the market any conviction on the party of the public
... , not to such an extent that there was any possibility of the public being defrauded by
others' use of the name." [d. at 1012.
In Jenney Mfg. Co. v. Leader Filling Stations Cmp., 196 N.E. 852 (1935), the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court distinguished between the extent of use required to establish own
ership of a "technical trademark," i.e., one that is neither generic or descriptive, and that
required to establish ownership of a non-technical trademark:
In the case of a technical trademark there must be a use in such circumstances as
to publicity and length of time as to show an intention to adopt the word or
symbol as a trade-mark .... In the case of a word not subject to exclusive appro
16.
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To provide more predictability as well as broader geographic pro
tection, Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946,18 Although the
Lanham Act provided expanded rights to those who took advantage of
its provisions for fecleral registration, it did not pre-empt state or com
mon law protection,19 In fact, registration is not considered to be a
means of obtaining trademark ownership itself, but rather a way of
obtaining certain statutory advantages not granted to those who
merely relied on common law trademark protection,20
Although the Lanham Act did not itself explicitly require com
mon law trademark ownership as a prerequisite to registration, it did
require the applicant to own and use the mark in interstate commerce
as a prerequisite to registration,21 The common law insistence on use
priation there must be such a use in connection with a product as to attach to the
word a secondary meaning, through association, as denoting the product of the
user.
[d. at 854. Because the defendant in this case had not proven such secondary meaning with
respect to the mark at issue, a mark considered to be descriptive, the court ruled in favor of
the plaintiff, even though the defendant had been the first use to use the mark in connec
tion with actual sales of the goods. [d.
See generally Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE LJ. 759, 764
(1990); Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and
Synthesis: II, 30 COLUM. L. REv 759,764-68 (1930); 2]. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPF;TITION §§ 16:1,16:4-16:7,16:11 (4th ed. 2000).
18. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1995). According to the Senate Report on the bill which led to the Lanham
Act:
The purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trademarks in one stat
ute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, to simplity registration and to make it
stronger and more liberal, to dispense with technical prohibitions and arbitrary
provisions, to make procedure simple, and relief against infringement prompt
and effective.
S. REp. No. 1333, 79th Congo 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274. See also 1
McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 5:4.
19. See generally 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at §§ 19:3,19:8.
20. See Zazu Designs V. L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1992) (registra
tion without actual use is insufficient to create rights in a mark); S Indus., Inc. V. Stone Age
Equip., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 796, 804-05 (N.D. III. 1998) (trademark rights are not ac
quired by registration alone, but depend on use of the mark on goods); S Indus., Inc. V.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., 991 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (N.D. III. 1998) (trademark rights are
not acquired by registration alone, but depend on use of the mark on goods). See also Wise
V. Bristol-Myers Co., 107 F. Supp. 800, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (invalidity of registration does
not affect party's common law trademark rights); The Jim Dandy CO. V. Martha White
Foods, Inc., 458 F.2d 1397,1402 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Lane,]., concurring) ("lack of capacity
to register does not necessarily mean lack of prior ownership or lack of the right to op
pose"). See also Carter, supra note 17, at 775-76.
21. 15 U.S.C. §1051 (1994). See Michael H. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Criti
cal Look at Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. Rev. 233, 247-50; 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at
§ 19:53.
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as the prerequisite for trademark protection was thus not eliminated
or overruled by Congress in 1946 when it enacted the Lanham Act. 22
Instead, there was a dual system for protection: common law protec
tion based on actual use, and federal protection based also on actual
use as well as use "in commerce," i.e., in the commerce "which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress."23 A party could oppose an applica
tion to register or seek to cancel a registration on the grounds that
that party had used the mark prior to the applicant/registrant and
that the applicant/registrant's use was likely to cause confusion with
the other's use. 24
Questions arose with respect to what quantum of "use" would suf
fice to satisfY the federal requirements for registration as compared to
the common law use requirement for trademark ownership. In Blue
Bell, Inc. v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc.,25 the Fifth Circuit addressed
this issue where two companies were contesting ownership of the
mark TIME OUT for men's dothing. 26 The case arose under common
law since neither party had applied to register the mark pursuant to
the Lanham Act. 27 Farah argued that an internal shipment to its sales
managers should suffice to establish use prior to Blue Bell. Farah re
lied on a Trademark Board decision, Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Mid
west Chrome Process CO.,28 where such internal shipments had been
considered sufficient for purposes of establishing "use in commerce"
for registration purposes. 29 The Fifth Circuit considered that case in
apposite, ruling that it did not affect the analysis of common law use
in trade, but dealt only with what would suffice for "use in commerce"
for purposes of federal registration. 30 Thus, the Court recognized that
there were two different contexts in which "first use" had to be de
fined-eo-ownership and federal registration-and that the quantum
22. See, e.g., New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 417 (lst Cir. 1951)
(ownership a condition precedent to registration). See also Macaulay v. Malt-Diastase Co., 4
F.2d 944, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1925) (only the owner of the trademark as determined by
prior use and adoption, even if intrastate, can register the trademark pursuant to the
Trademark Act of 1905; use in interstate commerce considered an additional requirement
for registration, but not itself necessary to establish ownership). See 3 McCARTHY, supra
note 17, at § 19:53.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See generally 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at §§ 19:10, 19:103-06,
19:113-15,19:117-19,19:123.
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1063(a), 1064 (1995).
25. 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975).
26. See id. at 1262.
27. See id. at 1264.
28. 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 758 (T.T.A.B. 1974).
29. See id. at 764-65.
30. See Blue Bell, 508 F.2d at 1266-67.
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of use required for one was not necessarily the same as that required
for the other.31
This created some confusion. As described by Professor Michael
Davis,32 in early applications of the Lanham Act a party could obtain
federal registration based on a minimal use in commerce as long as
there was some true commercial use, even if wholly intrastate. Profes
sor Davis pointed out that over time the federal courts and the Trade
mark Trial and Appeal Board collapsed the minimal "use in
commerce" requirement with the traditionally more demanding "use"
requirement to allow applicants to apply for federal registration on
the basis of minimal interstate activity alone, such as shipments across
state lines of insignificant quantities of a given product. 33 Professor
Davis argued that this watering down of the prerequisites for federal
registration resulted in part from pressure by companies and the
trademark bar seeking to ensure a means to obtain trademark protec
tion before entering the market with goods and services. 34
This watered down definition of "use" was coined "token use" and
was the subject of a great deal of criticism because it seemed to favor
larger companies at the expense of smaller companies and to make
a sham of the traditional requirements of use for trademark pro
tection. 35 These complaints about the "token use" doctrine were
31. See id. See also Davis, supra note 21, at 247-51. See also Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A.,
979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) ("use sufficient to register a mark is not necessarily
enough to acquire rights in the absence of registration"); Nat'l Cable Television Assoc.,
Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1578 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (prior use in
intrastate commerce is sufficient to oppose a mark, but not to register a mark). See generally
3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 19:116.
32. See Davis, supra note 21, at 251-59.
33. E.g., Societe de Developments Et D'lnnovations Des Marche Agricoles Et
Alimenfaires-Sodima-Union De Cooperatives Agricoles v. Int'l Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp.
839,847 (D. Ore. 1987) (doctrine of token use provides that "a single instance of use, if
accompanied by circumstances showing an intention to continue use is sufficient to estab
lish a right to use" (citing Ritz Cycle v. Priss-Seabury, 235 F. 125 (1916)); a 2 year period of
no sales following a $2.52 token sale did not invalidate plaintiff's trademark registration
where product was allegedly under development). Compare Sharkskins Surf Gear v. San
Jose Sharks, 1996 TIAB LEXIS 45, at *6-9 (1996) (where opposer's post-TLRAs registra
tions were found to be based only on token use, i.e., a handful of products had been given
to family and friends, registration was cancelled for failure to satisfy use requirements;
TLRA held to have eliminated token use as a basis for registration).
34. Davis, supra note 21, at 265-78.
35. Professor Davis was highly critical of the token use doctrine. He argued that trade
mark protection has an anti-competitive effect in that it distorts consumer preferences
based on familiarity with a preferred trademark and the goods or services with which it is
associated. [d. at 235-40. Thus, according to Davis:
[T]rademark use is important because, to the extent it imposes a substantive
(rather than a token) burden upon the marketer, there is some assurance that
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one of the contributing reasons for the enactment of the TLRA in
1988. 36
In addition to the conflicting definitions of "use" for purposes of
common law ownership and federal registration that arose after the
enactment of the Lanham Act, there is yet another doctrine and defi
nition of use: use analogous to trademark use. This doctrine allows
businesses to oppose federal trademark applications by another when
the opposer can establish that there has been sufficient publicity to
create a public association with its mark even before any of their
goods or services have entered the marketplace. The claim would be
valid as long as the opposer can also show actual commercial use
within a reasonable time. Case law established that opposers could as
sert such prior "use analogous to trademark use" to defeat an applica
tion to register a trademark by another, even if that applicant could
show that it made commercial use of the mark before any actual com
mercial use by the opposer. 37
the anticompetitive and monopolistic grant of trademark rights is justified ....
When trademark use is reduced to a procedural requirement, the trademark mo
nopoly loses all social justification.
[d. at 242-43. Professor Davis saw the efforts to pass intent-to-use legislation as led by busi
ness groups and their lawyers seeking to lower the bar to trademark protection even fur
ther. See id. at 259-63. See also Carter, supra note 17, discussed infra note 44.
36. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5577,5581; H. REp. No. 100-1028 at 15 (1988). See 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 19:110.
37. The earliest use of the phrase "use analogous to trademark use" appeared in a
slightly different context. In John Wood Mfg. Co. v. Servel, Inc., 77 F.2d 946 (C.C.P.A
1935), a party opposing a trademark registration for the mark "hostess" claimed priority
based on its use of the mark to designate a particular model of refrigerators it sold. Al
though the opposer admitted that it had not affixed that mark to such goods, the court
concluded that its use of the mark in its literature and advertising materials as well as the
fact that it received orders for goods under that name was "analogous to trademark use"
and thus sufficient to establish priority. That rather narrow definition of "use analogous to
trademark use" was expanded in Lever Bros. Co. v. Nobio Prods., 103 F.2d 917 (C.c.P.A.
1939), to cover an opposer's use of a slogan in advertising. More recently, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined "[ulse 'analogous' to trademark use" to mean "use
of a nature and extent such as to create an association of the term with the user's goods,"
Malcolm Nicol & Co. v. Witco Corp., 881 F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989), as for example,
in advertising brochures, catalogues, newspapers, press releases and trade publications.
Such use is sufficient to defeat a trademark registration by a party who affixes the mark to
the goods and uses it in commerce after the opposer's analogous use, "even though the
opposer itself is not entitled to federal registration because it has never used the term as an
affixed 'trademark.'" [d. Accord., Nat'l. Cable Television v. Am. Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d
1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991); The Jim Dandy Co. v. Martha White Foods, 458 F.2d 1397
(C.C.P.A. 1972); Geo. Washington Mint v. Washington Mint, 349 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). Cf Cullman Ventures v. Columbian Art Works, 717 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(court finds "use" analogous doctrine not relevant where relied on as defense to infringe
ment as opposed to'where relied on to establish priority to oppose the registration of a
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By 1988, there were thus several different definitions of the term
"use," and thus considerable confusion about what was necessary to
ensure rights to a trademark.
B.

The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 and the Requirement
of Use As a Prerequisite Eliminated

In 1988, Congress made a radical change in American trademark
law by allowing a party to apply for federal registration without having
demonstrated use of the mark either in ordinary trade or in com
merce, but rather on the basis of a bona fide intention to use the
mark in commerce. The legislative history of the TLRA identified sev
eral purposes behind this change.
First, the change was considered necessary to prevent unfair treat
ment of American companies as compared to foreign companies. In
the Senate Report on the bill that became the TLRA, it was stated that
"the United States is the only developed country that requires use of a
mark before an application for registration may be filed."38 Since for
eign applicants could rely on their foreign registrations to establish
priority over an American applicant and could obtain those foreign
registrations without use in their home country, a foreign applicant
could therefore establish priority over an American applicant without
having to show use of the mark anywhere. 39 The Senate Report also
considered the use requirement troublesome because of the uncer
tainty it created for American businesses. 4o The Report observed that
it was as a result of this uncertainty that the courts had created and
sanctioned the doctrine of "token use."41
Token use is a contrived and commercially transparent practice
nothing more than a legal fiction. At the same time, token use is
essential under current law because it recognizes present day mar
keting costs and realities; it reduces some of the legal and eco
nomic risks associated with entering the marketplace; and it
nominally achieves the threshold "use" required to apply for fed
eral registration and the creation of trademark rights in advance of
commercial use. 42
mark). See also infra text accompanying notes 117-28. See also 2 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at
§§ 16:12-16:14.
38. S. REp. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 V.S.C.C.A.N.
5577, 5581.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 6, 1988 V.S.C.C.A.N. at 5582.
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The Report then identified some of the problems created by the
token use doctrine: it was not available to all types of businesses, and it
allowed companies to register based on minimal activity, thus poten
tially clogging the trademark register with unused marks.43
In order to reduce the uncertainty facing American trademark
applicants and to eliminate the sham of token use, Congress passed
the TLRA and its alternative basis for securing federal trademark re
gistration: a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce. 44 How
ever, before considering whether that Act has achieved these goals, it
is necessary to first outline the essential steps of the lTV application
process.

c.

The Application Process Under Section l(b): The Intent-to-Use
Provisions

V nder Section 1 (b) of the Lanham Act as amended by the TLRA,
a party can now file an application to register a trademark on the basis
of that party's "bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the
good faith of such person, to use the mark in commerce."45 The appli
cant must verifY his or her belief that she or he is entitled to use the
mark in commerce, that she or he has a bona fide intention to use the
mark in commerce, and that no other person has the right to use the
mark in circumstances where such is likely to cause confusion with the
applicant's mark. 46
Once filed, the mark is subject to examination by an examiner in
the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to determine whether the
43. See id.
44. Id. See also Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., 146 F.3d 350, 356-57
(6th Cir. 1998) (discussing purposes of the TLRA, including elimination of token use doc
trine). See also Traci L.Jones, Remedy Holes and Bottomless Rights: A Critique of the Intent-to-Use
System of Trademark Registration, 59 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 159, 160 (1996); 3 McCAR
THY, supra note 17, at § 19: 110. See Carter, supra note 17, at 779-81. Professor Carter was
critical of the law's elimination of "use" as a requirement for applying for trademark pro
tection. He argued that to the extent the ITU system allows marks that do not serve to
identifY the good will associated with goods or services in the marketplace to be removed
from the "available market language," id. at 763, it exacts an unmerited economic cost
from potential competitors. Since the universe of words that can serve as effective trade
marks is not infinite, making some words unavailable creates economic barriers, according
to Professor Carter. See id. at 768-75. Since the TLRA makes it easier for parties to remove
a word from the universe of available marks and to do so without establishing the market
place significance of that word, it exacerbates this problem. Id. at 775-88. Professor Carter
thus preferred the common law basis for determining trademark rights. Id. at 760. See also
Davis, supra note 21, discussed at supra note 35.
45. 15 U.S.c. § 1051(b) (1994).
46. See 15 U.S.c. § 1051 (b) (3).
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mark is potentially eligible for registration, assuming that the appli
cant later satisfies the requirement of filing a statement of use, as de
scribed below. If the examiner so concludes, the mark is to be
published in the Official Gazette of the PTO. Any party who believes
that they would be damaged by the registration of that mark then has
thirty days to file an opposition. If the opposition is not successful,
then a notice of allowance is to be issued to the applicant. 47
The applicant then has six months from the date of the notice of
allowance to file a verified statement that the mark is in use in com
merce, specifying the date of first use and the goods or services with
which it is being used. 48 The applicant must also submit the required
number of specimens illustrating such use along with the requisite
fee. 49 The statute provides for extensions of time to file the statement
of use for up to three years from the issuance of the notice of allow
ance, although extensions beyond one year from the notice of allow
ance are not to be granted absent a showing of good cause. 50 All
requests for extension must fnclude a verified statement of the appli
cant's continued bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce. 51
Failure to file a statement of use before the expiration of the initial
period or of any extensions to such period results in the abandon
ment of the application.52
Once the statement of use is received by the PTO, it is to be ex
amined,53 including a review of the mark's compliance with Section 2
(a) through (e) of the Lanham Act, the sections which outline the
grounds for which registration of a mark may be refused. 54 If the state
ment of use is accepted, a certificate of registration will be issued to
the applicant, and notice of registration will be published in the Offi
cial Gazette. 55
Therefore, the applicant'S right to registration is still contingent
upon actual use of the mark. As the legislative history reveals, Con
gress included this prerequisite of actual use before registration "to
emphasize the central role that use continues to play in U.S. trade
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

55.
CARTHY,

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1062-63 (1994).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(l) (1994).
See id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1015(d)(4) (1994).
See id.
See 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051 (d) (2)-(4) (1994).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(I).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a)-(e) (1994).
See 15 V.S.c. § 1051(d)(I). For more on the lTV application process, see 3 Me.
supra note 17, at §§ 19:12-19:25.1.

694

UNIVERSIlY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

mark law."56 Congress also wanted to make it clear that "commercially
transparent practice of 'token use' "57 was to be eliminated byamend
ing the definition of "use in commerce" to read "the bona fide use of
the mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to
reserve a right in the mark."58 Thus, Congress lowered the threshold
for filing an initial application, but tightened the ultimate standard
for obtaining registration by eliminating token use and insisting on
genuine commercial use before registration would issue.
Section 7(c) of the Act, as amended by the TLRA, also had great
significance for lTV applicants as well as traditional use-based appli
cants. It provides in pertinent part that:
(c) Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal reg
ister provided by this Act, the filing of the application to register
such mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring
a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in connection with
the goods or services specified in the registration against any other
person except for a person whose maI;k has not been abandoned
and who, prior to such filing
(1) has used the mark; [or]
(2) has filed an application to register the mark which is pend
ing or has resulted in registration of the mark .... 59

Thus, an lTV applicant has "constructive use" as of the date of its
initial application, even though it may not in fact use the mark in the
marketplace for as long as three years after the notice of allowance has
issued for that application. It can thereby establish priority over those
who use a mark in trade before the lTV applicant has done so.
These seemingly straightforward provisions have not reduced the
uncertainty facing potential trademark registrants, but instead have
added to it by creating new procedural and interpretive issues.

n. The Muddled Meaning of "Use"
As discussed above, even before the enactment of the TLRA there
were multiple meanings of the word "use." To establish ownership of a
trademark, a party had to establish use of the mark in trade; owner
ship of an inherently distinctive mark would be established as of the
time of that first actual use in trade whereas ownership of mark that
was not inherently distinctive hinged on being the first party to estab
56. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5577,5586.
57. Id. at 44. See also 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5607.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1994).
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lish secondary meaning of the mark, Le., public association of the
mark with the alleged owner's goods or services. On the other hand,
to be eligible for federal registration a party also had to use the mark
"in commerce." Such a use could be minimal to establish an entitle
ment to federal registration, but the applicant also had to have used
the mark in trade, even if intrastate, to claim ownership of the mark.
As the importance of trademark protection grew in the increasingly
industrialized economy, courts created the doctrine of "token use" to
ease the burdens on those seeking to obtain federal trademark protec
tion and the doctrine of "use analogous to trademark use" to ease the
burden on those seeking to oppose another's trademark
registration. 60
One of the goals of the TLRA, as discussed above,61 was to elimi
nate the doctrine of "token use" and to require "bona fide use of the
mark in the ordinary course of trade" as the prerequisite to trademark
ownership for federal purposes. 62 At the same time, Congress recog
nized the need to ease the burden on applicants for federal registra
tion that had led to the creation of the token use doctrine to begin
with and to bring American law into conformity with the laws in other
places in the world that did not require actual use as a prerequisite to
trademark protection. Thus, Congress enacted the intent-to-use provi
sions to allow parties to apply for trademark registration before actual
use of the mark, but made registration itself hinge upon a subsequent
showing of actual use before a prescribed time period had elapsed.
Although Congress wanted to eliminate the uncertainty caused in part
by the conflicting and confusing definitions of use that the courts had
generated under the pre-TLRA law, the TLRA has failed to accom
plish that goal. There are still multiple and conflicting meanings of
"use" which continue to confuse those attempting to determine trade
mark ownership.
A.

What Is a Bona Fide Intent to Use?

The TLRA requires an lTD applicant to demonstrate a "bona fide
intent to use as the basis of its application." As interpreted by the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, this has led to a multifactored
inquiry into the mindset of an applicant.
60. See supra note 17.
61. See supra notes 38-44.
62. S. REp. No. 515, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5577, 5581-82.
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In several opinions, the Trademark Board has addressed the
question of what evidence an applicant must submit to demonstrate
its bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce. First, in Commo
dore Electronics Limited v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha,63 the Board addressed
the question of "whether the absence of any documents evidencing
applicant's claimed intention to use its mark may be sufficient to con
stitute objective proof of a lack of a bona fide intention to use."64 The
Board explored the legislative history of the TLRA and found that
Congress intended this requirement to focus on "an objective good
faith test to establish that an applicant's intent is genuine."65 The
Board quoted from the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the bill
that became the TLRA, which stated that:
Although 'bona fide' is an accepted legal term, it can be read
broadly or narrowly, subjectively or objectively, by a court or the
Patent and Trademark Office. In connection with this bill, 'bona
fide' should be read to mean a fair, objective determination of the
applicant'S intent based on all the circumstances. 66

The Board then went on to hold that
[A]bsent other facts which adequately explain or outweigh the fail
ure of an applicant to have any documents supportive of or bear
ing on its claimed intent to use its mark in commerce, the absence
of any documentary evidence on the part of an applicant regarding
such intent is sufficient to prove that the applicant lacks a bona
fide intention to use its mark in commerce as required by Section
l(b).67

The Board recognized, however, that an applicant could attempt
to rebut this by introducing additional evidence regarding its bona
fide intent to use. On the evidence before it, the Board concluded
that sufficient evidence had been introduced to create questions of
material fact. 68 Specifically, the applicant had introduced evidence re
garding its use of a mark (AJCBM) similar to the one in its lTV appli
cation (ACBM) on similar goods; the Board considered this evidence .
of the applicant's capacity to produce the goods listed in its current
application. 69 On the other hand, it also considered it evidence sup
porting the opposer's claim of applicant'S absence of a bona fide in
63. 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
64. [d. at 1506.
65. !d.
66. S. REp. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1988), quoted in Commodore Elees.
Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1506 n.7, reprinted in 1988 V.S.C.CAN.
5577, 5586-87.
67. Commodore Elees. Ltd., 26 V.S.P.Q.2d at 1507.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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tention to use the mark CBM, since the only mark that applicant had
used on the relevant goods was JCBM.70 Observing that questions of
intent are largely factual and thus generally unsuited to disposition by
summary judgment, the Board denied both parties' motions for sum
mary judgment. 71
The applicant in Lane Limited v. Jackson International Trading Com
pany Kurt D. Bruhl Gesell5chaft m.b. G. & Co. KG72 had greater success
on its motion for summary judgment on the question of its bona fide
intention to use. Like the applicant in Commodore, the applicant in
Lane relied on evidence of its use of a similar mark on the same cate
gory of goods as evidence of its bona fide intention to use the neW
mark on such goods. 73 The applicant also relied on evidence of its
efforts to license its mark outside of the United States and to obtain
non-U.S. licensees. 74 The opposer relied on this same evidence to dis
prove the applicant's intention to use the mark in commerce, arguing
that it was irrelevant to the applicant's intention to use the subject
mark in United States commerce. 75 The opposer also argued that evi
dence of the applicant's attempts to secure an American licensee were
irrelevant since they occurred ten months after the date of the filing
of the lTU application. 76
In analyzing the evidence, the Board observed that although an
applicant's "mere statement of subjective intention, without more,
would be insufficient to establish applicant's bona fide intention to
use the mark in commerce,"77 the language and the legislative history
of the TLRA failed to specify "the particular type or quantum of objec
tive evidence that an applicant must produce to corroborate or de
fend its claimed bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce."78
The Board concluded that the applicant in this case, unlike the appli
cant in Commodore, had submitted some documentary evidence and
that that evidence was sufficient to establish the applicant's bona fide
intention to use. 79 The Board considered the applicant's efforts to se
cure non-U .S. licensees relevant as it tended to prove the existence of
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id.
See id. at 1507-08.
33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
See id. at 1354-55.
See id.
See id. at 1354.
See id.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
See id. at 1356.
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a business plan and licensing program. 80 The Board also considered
probative the predecessor's use of a similar mark on similar goods in
that it demonstrated prior experience and success in the relevant in
dustry.8' Further, the Board considered the evidence of applicant's
activities ten months after its application relevant, reasoning the
neither the statute nor Commodore imposed any "specific requirement
as to the contemporaneousness of an applicant's documentary evi
dence corroborating its claim of bona fide intention."82
In Salacuse v. Ginger Spirits8 3 a registrant defended itself against a
petition to cancel on the grounds that the petitioner's own registra
tions were invalid because the petitioner had lacked a bona fide inten
tion to use the mark when it applied for registration. 84 Mter
discussing the procedural issues, the Board addressed the merits of
the respondent'S arguments, citing both Lane and Commodore. 85 The
Board quoted from the legislative history of the TLRA with respect to
what types of evidence might be relevant to disprove a bona fide inten
tion to use the mark:
For example, the applicant may have filed numerous intent-ta-use
applications to register the same mark for many more new prod
ucts than are contemplated, numerous intent-to-use applications
for a variety of desirable trademarks intended to be used on [a]
single new product, numerous intent-to-use applications to register
marks consisting of or incorporating descriptive terms relating to a
contemplated new product, numerous intent-ta-use applications
which have lapsed because no timely declaration of use has been
filed, an excessive number of intent-ta-use applications to register
marks which ultimately were not actually used, an excessive num
ber of intent-ta-use applications in relation to the number of prod
ucts the applicant is likely to introduce under the applied-for
marks during the pendency of the applications, or applications un
reasonably lacking in specificity in describing the proposed goods.
Other circumstances may also indicate the absence of genuine
bona fide intent to actually use the mark. 86

The Board found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to the petitioner's bona fide intent based on evidence of the numer
ous lTV applications it had filed for the mark for "a wide variety of
80.
81.
82.

83.

See id.
See id.
[d.

44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415 (T.T.A.B. 1997).
See id. at 1416-17.
See id. at 1420.
86. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 23-24, 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5586,
as quoted in Salacuse v. Ginger Spirits, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420. See also 3 McCARTHY, supra
note 17, at §§ 19:12-14.
84.
85.
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goods ranging from food and beverages to luggage to furniture to
motor vehicles."87 Thus, petitioner's motion for summary judgment
on the question of its bona fide intent was denied. 88
In Advertising to Women v. Gianni Versace S.p.A.,89 the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois indicated its approval of the ap
proach taken by the Board to determinations of a bona fide intent to
use a mark. 90 Citing the Lane decision and the legislative history of the
TLRA, it called for a "fair, objective determination of all the circum
stances,"91 including the same factors reflecting on the applicant's in
tent mentioned in Lane. In the case before it, the court concluded
that summary judgment on the issue of the applicant's bona fide in
tent was inappropriate, and that the issue was "best resolved at trial
and upon a full exposition of the evidence."92
These decisions indicate that although it may not be difficult for
an lTV applicant to defeat an opposer's motion for summary judg
ment with respect to the issue of its bona fide intention to use a mark,
it will be difficult in many cases for an lTV applicant to obtain sum
mary judgment on this issue, meaning that most of such matters will
necessitate a trial. This gives those who wish to oppose an lTV applica
87. Saiacuse, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420.
88. See id. Other Board decisions reveal the difficulty of defining what quantity or
quality of evidence will suffice to demonstrate bona fide intent to use or a lack thereof. In
Discovery Communications, Inc. v. Cooper, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 185 (2000) (not citable as
precedent), the Board considered an affidavit from the applicant describing "an informal
analysis of the educational toy and educational printed materials markets," id. at *4, that he
had engaged in prior to filing his ITU application and a trademark search he had re
quested prior to filing sufficient evidence of his bona fide intent to use to raise a genuine
issue of material fact and to survive summary judgment. The applicant in Pixel Instruments
Corp. v. Sweven Corp., 1999 TTAB LEXIS 715 (1999) (not citable as precedent), was
granted summary judgment on this issue of its bona fide intention to use the mark on the
basis of evidence of steps taken to create a graphic design/logo for the mark and prepara
tion of a brochure two months after the filing the ITU application. Relying on the Lane
decision, the Board concluded that these activities were "sufficiently contemporaneous to
the application filing date to serve as corroboration of applicant'S declaration in the appli
cation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce." Id. at *6. See also Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Nutrience, 1996 TTAB LEXIS 499 (1996) (not citable as precedent) (op
poser's motion for summary judgment denied even though applicant had submitted no
documentary evidence of its intent to use the mark other than a later submitted sworn
statement of its continuing intention to use the mark). Cf American Forests v. Sanders,
1999 TTAB LEXIS 529 (1999) (not citable as precedent) (no bona fide intention to use
the mark found where individual applicant planned to use mark not individually, but as
part of a partnership arrangement).
89. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12490 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
90. See id. at *12-13.
91. Id. at *12.
92. Id. at *5.
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tion a rather simple method of delaying the notice of allowance and
the ultimate registration of such marks. Such delays undermine the
Congressional goal of simplifying the application process for those
wishing to apply based on the intention to use the mark. The more
evidence of intent these applicants need to produce, the more cum
bersome the process and the less effective it will be as an alternative to
the traditional use-based application process.
B.

What Constitutes "Prior Use" Sufficient to Oppose Successfully
an lTV Application?

Parties who believe they may be damaged by an lTV application
can file an opposition to that application. One traditional basis for
opposing a use-based application was prior use by the opposer of a
mark that is likely to be confused with the applicant's mark. 93 Since
"use" is not required for an lTV application itself, questions arose
about the continuing validity of such an opposition and about how to
determine "priority of use" between an lTV applicant and an opposer
claiming prior use.
In Allard Enterprises v. Advanced Programming Resources,94 the Sixth
Circuit ruled that the changes made by the TLRA did not alter the way
courts should determine priority of use as between two parties claim
ing ownership of a trademark. 95 Although the case did not involve
lTV applications, it reaffirmed that a party can defend itself against a
registrant's claim of trademark infringement by demonstrating its
"first actual use of a mark in a genuine commercial transaction" prior
to the registrant's first use.9 6 The court also noted that "ownership
may be established even if the first uses are not extensive and do not
result in deep market penetration or widespread recognition."97 As
applied to the case before it which involved a mark to be used in con
nection with employee placement services, the court concluded that
the defendant had established its priority of use by using the mark "on
at least one fax, on at least one resume, and in numerous other solici
tations, as they offered [their] services to several employers . . . ."98
The court further found that the defendant's use was sufficiently pub
lic, as several large companies identified the mark with defendant,
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994).
146 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 357.
[d. at 358.
[d.
[d. at 359.
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and that defendant's use was sufficiently consistent and continuous
over several years to establish priority.99 The court reached this con
clusion even though the defendant had not in fact placed one em
ployee with an employer and had primarily been engaged in a word
of-mouth campaign to find employers with potential positions that
might need filling. loo Thus, the court did not define the standard of
use to establish priority very strictly and relied on established pre
TLRA law to define that standard.
The Sixth Circuit applied the same standard in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Carmax, Inc.,101 but in the context of an attempt to establish
priority predating the filing date of plaintiff's lTV application. The
court recognized that a party's use prior to the applicant's filing of an
lTV application could trump the constructive use date. 102 In Circuit
City Stores, however, the court concluded that the defendant's activities
which predated the plaintiff's constructive use date were not sufficient
to constitute actual use. 103 Although the defendant had used the mark
in radio advertisements that were aired extensively during that rele
vant time period, had used the mark on various business documents,
and had established some recognition in the local trade, the court
pointed to the defendant's failure to use the mark in other aspects of
its business for example, in its phone listing or printed advertise
ments, and its failure to introduce evidence of consumer awareness of
its mark. l04 The court concluded that there had not been actual use
of the mark by defendant to establish its priority over the plaintiff. l05
The court distinguished its decision in Allard by pointing to the evi
dence there of widespread public recognition. l06 Although the mark
at issue was found to be suggestive, thus not requiring secondary
meaning to establish ownership,107 the court nevertheless placed
great weight on the degree of public recognition:
Evidence of public recognition is only necessary in cases requiring
proof of secondary meaning, but such evidence may be probative
of a party's actual use of a mark in cases where secondary meaning
is not required . . . . Public recognition is probative of a party's
actual use of a mark for the obvious reason that the public cannot
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

107.

See id. at
See id.
165 F.3d
See id. at
See id. at
See id.
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

359-60.
1047 (6th Cir. 1999).
1053.
1055.
1053.
1055.
1054.
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be aware of a mark's association with a service or product unless
the party has actually used the mark to create this association. lOB

Thus, since the defendant in Allard had been able to prove wide
spread public awareness of its mark whereas the defendant in Circuit
City had not, the court found reason to affirm the district court's rul
ing that the defendant in Circuit City had not established use prior to
the plaintiff's constructive use date. The Sixth Circuit thus has placed
critical importance on the proof of public recognition of the mark
and its association with the party claiming ownership for establishing
priority over a later filed lTV applicant or a later user.
That emphasis on public recognition is also evident in the Sev
enth Circuit's decision in Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Foot
ball Company.109 In that case Blastoff had filed two lTV applications for
the mark ST. LOVIS RAMS on March 10, 1995, two months after the
owner of the Los Angeles Rams publicly announced at a press confer
ence that the Los Angeles Rams football franchise would be relocating
to St. Louis. The press conference was covered by the local and na
tional media which reported the announcement in papers and other
media nationwide. llo Even before that announcement, there had
been reports beginning as early as December 1993 in newspapers of a
possible move of the team to St. Louis, and shortly after the press
conference the team began selling licenses for the right to acquire
seasons tickets to Rams games in St. Louis. 111 Officially licensed mer
chandise bearing the ST. LOVIS RAMS mark were not sold until
April, 1995, after Blastoffs filing date, and Blastoff filed suit seeking a
declaration of his rights to the trademark and other remedies.11 2 The
district court granted the defendants, the owners of the team, sum
mary judgment, and Blastoff appealed. 113
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the lower court's determination
that the defendants had established priority of use of the ST. LOVIS
RAMS mark because prior to Blastoff's filing of his lTV application, "a
significant portion of the public associated the mark with the Rams
football club"114 as a result of the publicity on and after the press con
108. [d. at 1055. Accord, Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp.,
174 F.3d 1036, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (registration of domain name with intent to use it
commercially is not sufficient to establish priority because not sufficiently public).
109. 188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1999).
llO. See id. at 431.
lll. See id.
ll2. See id. at 430-31.
ll3. See id. at 431.
114. [d. at 434.

Summer 200 I]

FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGULATION

703

ference and a result of the prior use of the very similar mark LOS
ANGELES RAMS in connection with the same football club. I 15 Thus,
although no games had been played and no licensed merchandise
had been sold by defendant as of Blastoffs filing date, the public asso
ciation of the mark with the defendant was sufficient to establish pri
ority of use. 1l6
The Federal Circuit has also defined a fairly demanding standard
of proof for establishing priority. In T.A.B. Systems v. Pactel Teletrac,117
the Federal Circuit vacated the Trademark Board's grant of summary
judgment to Pactel opposing T.A.B.'s application to register the mark
TELETRAC for automobile tracking services. 118 The Board had con
cluded that Pactel had established priority by "use analogous to trade
mark use," based on evidence of use of the mark in press releases,
press kits, slide show presentations to seven potential customers, pres
ence at a trade show, marketing brochures, and newspaper articles
covering Pactel's planned services. 119 However, Pac tel had not yet pro
vided any actual services using the mark. The Federal Circuit dis
agreed with the Board, finding such evidence insufficient. 120 The
court noted that only one of the press releases had been widely distrib
uted and that there was a lack of evidence as to widespread distribu
tion of the other materials as well. 121 The court concluded that
Pactel's evidence failed to meet the standard necessary to establish use
analogous to trademark use: "[A]dvertising of sufficient clarity and
repetition to create the required identification must have reached a
substantial portion of the public that might be expected to purchase
the service."122
The Trademark Board has also been demanding in its definition
of use analogous to trademark use. For example, in Universal Technolo
gies v.Jillson and Roberts, Inc.,123 Universal Technologies petitioned to
cancel a registration owned by Jillson and Roberts on the basis of Uni
versal's alleged priority based on pre-sales solicitation activities, in
cluding letters to potential customers, attendance at a trade show, and
1I5. See id. at 434.
1I6. See id. at 434-35.
1I7. 77 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1I8. See id. at 1378.
1I9. See id. at 1373.
120. See id. at 1375.
121. See id.
122. [d. at 1377. See also Windows User, Inc. V. Reed Bus. Publ'g. Ltd. 805 F. Supp. 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (plaintiff's preparatory activities insufficient to establish likelihood of suc
cess of proving priority over defendant for purposes of request for preliminary injunction).
123. 1997 TTAB LEXIS 163 (1997).
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hiring a sales representative. 124 The Board, relying on the court's rul
ing in 1~A.B. v. Pactel, ruled that such evidence was insufficient to es
tablish priority.125 Similarly, in RocinLaboratories, Inc. v. Surgijet, Inc.,126
use of the mark on a website to promote a medical device and making
a prototype, carrying it across state lines, and using it on patients were
considered insufficient to establish prior use in an opposition pro
ceeding because such activities did not "in any way establish that the
trademark was affixed thereto, or that relevant purchasers were aware
of this use."127 The Board reasoned, "While it is well settled that an
opposer may base its opposition on prior use of a term in a manner
analogous to trademark use; it is also true that such an opposition can
succeed only where the 'analogous use' is of such a nature and extent
as to create public identification of the term with opposer's
product."128
The Third Circuit has taken an even more stringent approach to
defining use for purposes of establishing priority over an lTV applica
tion. In Lucent Information Management v. Lucent Technologies,129 the
court applied a four-part test to determine whether the plaintiff had
proven actual use of the mark LUCENT prior to the date of the defen
dant's lTV application. Relying upon its earlier decision in Natural
Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx,130 the Court concluded that
the plaintiff had to establish that the "market penetration of a trade
mark in an area is sufficient to warrant protection ..."131 by introduc
ing evidence of the sales volume of the trademarked product, the
growth trends of that product, the number of persons actually
purchasing the product in relation to potential customers, and the
extent of advertising. 132 Based on these four factors, the court con
cluded that the plaintiff had not established prior use, given that it
had made only one sale, had not invested in advertising, had not ex
124. See id. at *8.
125. See id. at *22.
126. 1999 TIAB LEXIS 458 (1999) (not citable as precedent).
127. [d. at *6.
128. [d. at *7. See also Trimedyne, Inc. v. Myriadlase, Inc., 1997 TIAB LEXIS 391
(1997) (not citable as precedent) (promotional activities insufficient). Cf Snake River
Brewing Co. v. Lewis & Clark Snake River Beverage Co., 1997 TIAB LEXIS 155 (1997)
(lTV applicant's use of mark to solicit investors and distributors of its product held to be
insufficiently public to constitute "use analogous to trademark use" to defeat opposer's
claim to priority based on actual commercial use of the mark).
129. 186 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 1999).
130. 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1985).
131. 186 F.3d at 317 (quoting Natural Footwear Ltd. V. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760
F.2d 1383, 1398 (3d Cir. 1985».
132. See Lucent, 186 F.3d at 317.
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panded beyond its initial set-up, and had made relatively few sales
presentations. 133
Judge Ackerman dissented from the majority's decision, arguing
that the Court had applied the wrong standard. 134 In the dissent's
view the majority had erroneously applied the standard for determin
ing the extent of geographic penetration in conflicts between users in
different geographic regions. 135 Judge Ackerman concluded that
under the Allard test for prior use, the plaintiff had met its burden of
demonstrating sufficient use to establish priority over the defen
dant. 136 He argued that the m<yority's stringent definition of use for
purposes of determining priority would undermine the purposes of
trademark law, especially in today's economy:
In this global economy where goods are often sold over a wide area
rather than in a neighborhood store, the majority's rule penalizes
small companies who attempt to take advantage of the national
market. It is ironic that the majority sets forth such a high standard
of use in this day and age when there is a technological revolution
underway in which the internet permits small trademark users to
sell their goods and services to broad geographic areas. The major
ity's standard of use places a legal straigacket on those companies
and deprives them of all common law trademark rights. 137

In contrast to these strict standards, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York took a seemingly quite lenient ap
proach for defining the test to establish priority over an lTV applica
tion in Redisar Limited v. Virgin Enterprises Limited. 138 In that case the
plaintiff had filed an lTV application for the mark VIRGIN to be used
in connection with cola and argued that the defendant had not estab
lished prior use of the mark VIRGIN since the defendant had not
used the mark on cola but only on unrelated products. 139 The court,
however, refused to vacate the temporary restraining order it had is
sued in the defendant's favor, reasoning that the defendant might suf
fer hardship and irreparable harm if the plaintiff introduced its cola
into the market under the trademark VIRGIN.140 Thus, without a full
hearing on the f~ctual issues regarding likelihood of confusion, the
court impeded an lTV applicant's ability to begin actual use of its
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id. at 317-18.
See id. at 318 (Ackerman, j., dissenting).
See id. at 323-26.
See id. at 320-23.
ld. at 325 (Ackerman, j., dissenting).
33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2020 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
See id. at 2021.
See id. at 2022-23.
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mark because of another's prior use of the mark on unrelated
products. 141
There is thus a conflict among the various Circuits with respect to
defining the extent of activity necessary to establish priority over an
lTV application. Whereas the Third Circuit in Lucent Information Man
agement, the Federal Circuit, and the Trademark Board have adopted
a rather stringent standard in their determinations, other courts have
continued to use a more lenient standard for determining "use analo
gous to trademark use" to protect those who have engaged in suffi
cient pre-sales activities to create public recognition. Thus, an lTV
applicant cannot be assured of any rights even if it does file as early as
possible and before any actual sales by another party.142
C.

What Constitutes Sufficient "Vse" to Allow an lTV Applicant to
"Tack" on Activities Prior to Its lTV Filing Date?

In Dyneer Corp. v. Automotive Products,143 the Trademark Board
faced what it considered to be an issue of first impression: under what
circumstances could an lTV applicant rely on use that predated its fil
ing of the lTV application in order to establish priority over an op
poser who claimed to have used the mark before that filing date? In
the case the applicant had filed its lTV application on November 8,
1991, but the opposer claimed that its activities prior to that date were
sufficient to establish its priority. 144 In response, the applicant asserted
that its predecessor in interest had in fact been engaged in "use analo
gous to trademark use" several years prior to the opposer's activi
ties. 145 Applicant argued that it should be able to "tack" these earlier
activities on to its lTV application to establish its priority over op
poser. 146 Opposer argued that applicant should not be able to take
advantage of those activities, especially in light of the fact that there
had been no activity during more than a two year period between the
predecessor's activities and applicant's lTV application. 147
141. See also Housing & SelVices, Inc. v. Minton, 1997 No. 97 Civ. 2725 (SHS), 1997
V.S. Dist. LEXIS 8883 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (promotional and preparatory activities to restore
and reopen a playhouse were sufficient "use analogous to trademark use" to defeat defen
dant's claim to priority based in part on the date of fili,ng of his lTV application).
142. See also Jones, supra note 44, at 177-80 (arguing that if the standard for establish
ing priority over an lTV applicant is made too demanding, then lTV registrants may have
rights that are unduly broad).
143. 37 V.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (T.T.A.B. 1995).
144. See id. at 1254-55.
145. See id. at 1256.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1257.
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The Board ruled that an applicant should be allowed to tack ac
tivities predating the filing of its lTV application in order to establish
priority over an opposer. 148 The Board recognized, however, that if an
applicant relies on use analogous to trademark use for purposes of
such tacking, it needed to demonstrate also that it had "engaged in a
continuing effort to cultivate an association of the ... mark with itself
and its goods"149 up to the time of the filing of the lTV application.
The Board thus modified the usual requirements for use analogous to
trademark use. 150 Whereas the traditional use of this doctrine for pur
poses of establishing priority over a use-based applicant requires a
showing of actual trademark use by the opposer within a commercially
reasonable period of time, the Board modified the test to require
proof by the applicant only of a continuing effort to create the associa
tion between the mark and the applicant up until the applicant'S fil
ing of the lTV application. 151 Since there were questions of fact that
needed to be resolved with respect to that issue, the Board denied
both parties' motions for summary judgment.152
Thus, the creation of the lTV regime has led to new issues with
respect to tacking and with respect to the meaning of "use analogous
to trademark use" in the context of such tacking. By reducing the bur
den on lTV applicants who wish to establish priority by demonstrating
"use analogous to trademark use," the Board has created two different
standards: one for lTV applicants and another for opposers and use
based applicants. 153 This double standard and the continuing confu
sion over what will constitute "use analogous to trademark use" will
only serve to increase the uncertainty regarding lTV applications.
D.

What Will Constitute "Vse" for Purposes of the Statement
of Use?

As discussed above,154 an lTV applicant has up to three years af
ter the issuance of the notice of allowance to file a statement of use
and thus complete the requirements for obtaining registration. Fail
148. See id. at 1256.
149. [d.
150. See id. ..
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1257.
153. See also Corporate Document Serv., Inc. v. I.C.E.D. Mgmt., Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1477, 1479 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (allowing applicant to tack on to its ITU application
wholly intrastate activities in order to establish priority over an opposer which used the
mark prior to the applicant's filing of the ITU application).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
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ure to file a satisfactory statement of use in a timely fashion will render
the application and the notice of allowance invalid, and the applicant
will lose its right to register that mark pursuant to that application.
The Trademark Board has taken a rather strict approach to determin
ing the adequacy of statements of use, both in terms of technical re
quirements 155 and the substantive requirement that the applicant
actually use the mark in the ordinary course of trade before filing the
statement of use.
Thus, in yet another context, the definition of "use" becomes crit
ical: What activities will suffice to satisfy the requirements for the state
ment of use? Congress made it clear that token use would no longer
suffice for registration under the "use" based registration provision,156
and the courts and the Board have recognized that "token use" has
been eliminated as a basis for filing a use-based application. 157 In de
termining the sufficiency of use for purposes of the statement of use
filed in connection with an ITU application, a similarly demanding
standard has been exacted. In Harker's, Inc. v. Kelley,158 the petitioner
argued that respondent had not engaged in sufficient commercial ac
tivities to support her statement of use filed in connection with an
ITU application. 159 The respondent had filed an ITU application on
July 15, 1991, for the mark FOOD DUDES to be used in connection
with the production of educational television programs about nutri
tion. Although the respondent had engaged in a great deal of prepar
atory and promotional activities relating to these television programs,
the Board concluded that as of the date of the filing of her statement
of use on February 26, 1993, the respondent had not actually used the
mark in a way that satisfied the requirements for filing a statement of
use. 160 The Board observed that:
155. For example, the applicant must include specimens demonstrating their use of
the mark in connection with the goods or seIVices identified on the notice of allowance,
not other goods or seIVices. See In re Goldencare, 1998 TIAB LEXIS 205 (1998) (not
citable as precedent).
156. See 15 U.S.C. §1051 (a) (1994).
157. E.g., James E. White v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 96-1096, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3079 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (TLRA eliminated token use as basis for registration; appli
cant's use did not meet standard required for registration); Sharkskin Surf Gear, Inc. v.
San Jose Sharks, 1996 TIAB LEXIS 45, at *8 (distribution of a handful of the registrant's
product was merely token use and not sufficient to survive a petition to cancel). See also
Advertising to Women v. Gianni Versace, No. 98-61553, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12490, at
*14 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (TLRA eliminated token use as basis for registration).
158. 1996 TTAB LEXIS 283 (1996) (not citable as precedent).
159. See id. at *16.
160. See id.
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[W]hile respondent began offering her production services associ
ated with the mark FQOD DUDES for sale in May 1991, has contin
uously since that date been in a position to render these services,
and has extensively promoted the services in conjunction with the
mark, the services had not actually been rendered as of the filing
date of respondent's statement of use, namely February 26,
1993. 161

The fact that the applicant had created a promotional video, au
dio cassette and booklet to be used in marketing her services was in
sufficient in light of her failure to perform production services for any
customers prior to filing her statement of use. The Board held that
promotional activities are not sufficient to serve as the basis of federal
registration, distinguishing the registration context from the priority
context where such activities may suffice as use analogous to trade
mark use to establish priority.162 The Board in fact recognized that
respondent could rely on these very same promotional activities to
establish priority over the petitioner in a later proceeding, but held
that they were insufficient to support her statement of use and thus
the registrations which had been issued in her favor. 163
Respondent later sought to revive her claim in a new proceeding,
relying on new evidence of her actual use of the mark, FOOD
DUDES, prior to her statement of use. 164 She asserted that she had
completed an installment of her proposed. television program and
had made actual sales of videotapes of that installment to out-of-state
customers. The Board found the completion of an installment of the
television show and out of state sales were insufficient to constitute use
since she had not produced these videotapes at the request of, or for
the benefit of, any customers and thus had not engaged in production
services, the services recited as the subject of her trademark applica
tion. Thus, the Board entered final judgment granting the petition to
cancel the respondent's mark. 165
This strict definition of "use" for purposes of the statement of use
was applied and justified in Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Station Casinos, Inc. 166
Hilton Hotels had filed a petition to cancel Station's registration of
the mark WILD WILD WEST for hotel services and casino and gam
bling services on the grounds that Station had not made sufficient use
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

166.

[d.

See id.
See id. at *16-17.
See id.
See id. at *2.
2000 TIAB LEXIS 187 (2000) (not citable as precedent).
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of the mark at the time it filed its statement of use. 167 Although Sta
tion had used the mark on a sign outside a pre-existing facility when it
faced delays in plans for a new facility, the Board denied Station's
motion for summary judgment. 168 The Board found that:
[W] hile [Station] made use of the mark prior to filing its statement
of use, there remain genuine issues of material fact concerning (1)
whether the scope and extent of [Station's] activities, prior to the
filing of its statement of use in November, 1996, are sufficient to
establish commercial scale use and (2) whether respondent made
use of the mark prior to filing its statement of use sufficient to
create an association with the offered hotel services. 169

The Board justified this high standard by .looking to the legislative
history of the TLRA and Congress's desire to eliminate the abuses of
token use and to institute instead a "higher hurdle for the quantum
and nature of use of a mark in commerce to qualify for
registration. "170
The Board is thus taking a fairly demanding approach to deter
mining the adequacy of statements of use, at least where such state
ments are challenged by third parties. ITU applicants must therefore
be careful to pass this examination or else find their applications or
registrations invalidated.

III.

Procedural Problems Created by the TLRA

The structure of the TLRA has created several procedural and
interpretive problems for the PTO and for the courts. In part, these
problems stem from the two step process for obtaining an intent to
use registration. Under Section 1 (b), when a party applies for trade
mark registration based on a bona fide intent to use the mark in com
merce, the application is filed and examined preliminarily by the
PTO, and if accepted, a notice of allowance will be issued.l71 The ap
plicant then needs to file a timely statement of use as a prerequisite to
registration itself. 172 When a statement of use is filed, the PTO again
engages in an evaluation process before issuing a registration. 173
This two step process and the time delay between the steps have
led to two different questions. First, what is the effect of the filing of
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at *1.
See id. at *2.
[d. at *6-7.
[d. at *6.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (b)(l) (A) (1994).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(I) (1994).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1052 (1994).
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the lTV application with respect to other parties before the registra
tion itself issues? Second, what issues can be raised at the time of the
filing of the application, and what issues can be raised when the state
ment of use is filed?
A.

The Effect of Filing the Application and Receiving a Notice of
Allowance

Within two years of the effective date of the TLRA, the Trade
mark Trial and Appeal Board had to resolve an important interpretive
and procedural issue with respect to the effect on an applicant'S rights
of the filing of the intent to use application. In Zirco Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph CO.,174 the applicant had filed an ITV applica
tion for the mark DATACEL on January 11,1990. 175 Shortly thereafter
on April 15, 1990, the opposer allegedly made actual first use of the
mark in commerce. 176 The opposer filed a notice of opposition to the
registration of the applicant's mark on the basis of this first actual use,
claiming priority of use. 177 In response, the applicant relied on Sec
tion 7(c) of the Trademark Act, which confers a right of priority as of
the date of the filing of an application to register a mark as against any
other person who "prior to such filing (1) has used the mark; [or] (2)
has filed an application to register the mark which is pending or has
resulted in registration of the mark ...."178 Such right of priority is,
however, contingent upon the registration of the mark. 179 Thus, ac
cording to the applicant, since its filing date preceded the opposer's
alleged first use, the applicant had priority by virtue of the construc
tive use provision in Section 7(C).180
Opposer argued in response that the constructive use date did
not apply to the applicant because no registration had yet issued for
the mark. Section 7(c) by its own terms said that its provisions for
constructive use were "contingent upon registration." Since applicant
had not yet perfected its rights in its mark by use and then registra
tion, opposer contended that applicant could not "prevent opposer
from acquiring common law rights in its mark"181 superior to the con
tingent rights of applicant.
174.
175.
176.
177.
17S.
179.
ISO.
lSI.

21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542 (T.T.A.B. 1991).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1542.
15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1994).
See id.
See Zirco, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1543.
Id. at 1543.
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The Board concluded otheIWise; it reasoned that:
It is true that a reading of Section 7(c) alone ... might be con
strued to limit an applicant's right to rely upon the constructive
use date as the first use date of its mark to post-registration actions.
But the Board does not believe that such a literal interpretation of
Section 7(c) can be adopted. 182

The Board examined the legislative history of the TLRA and found
that the constructive use provision was "essential to the intent to use
system. Without this provision, an intent-to-use applicant would be vul
nerable to theft of its mark or to innocent use of the mark by anyone
after filing of its application."183 Such vulnerability would defeat the
goals of encouraging early filing of applications to give notice to po
tential future users, giving lTV applicants superior rights over those
who adopted a mark after the lTV application was filed, and prevent
ing others from acquiring. common law rights after that filing date. 184
Thus, the Board concluded,
With these being the aims of the constructive use provision, there
can be no doubt but that the right to rely upon the constructive
use date comes into existence with the filing of the intent-to-use
application and that an intent-to-use applicant can rely upon this
date in.an opposition brought by a third party asserting common
law rights. 185

According to the Board, the "contingent upon registration" language
in Section 7(c) only meant that no final judgment could be issued in
favor of an lTV applicant until registration. 186 The Board recognized
this interim state in the case before it by noting, after dismissing the
opposition, that once the mark was registered, the applicant should
inform the Board so that it could take steps to terminate the proceed
ing. 187 Thus, no final judgment was to be entered, leaving parties with
unsettled rights until registration itself is obtained. 188
182. Id. at 1544.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1544.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 1544-45. See also 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 19:29 (concluding that
lTV applicant should not be precluded from completing lTV application process by op
poser who first uses mark after lTV constructive use date). Professor McCarthy also con
cluded that the contingent nature of the rights provided to lTV applicants prior to
registration could lead to considerable uncertainty. Although a party using a mark after
the filing date of an lTV applicant could not be enjoined prior to registration of the lTV
applicant's mark, that party is "living on borrowed time," id. at §§ 19:30, 19:64, and would
be acting irrationally if it invested resources in using a mark the use of which could be
enjoined once the lTV applicant obtained registration. McCarthy concluded that "the vast
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Although Zirco appeared to resolve for the Trademark Board the
question of the effect of constructive use before registration where an
opposer files a notice of opposition to an· ITU application, federal
courts have resolved the issue differently. In Talk to Me Products, Inc. v.
Larami COrp.,189 the plaintiff, Talk to Me Products ("TTMP"), filed suit
against the defendant Larami for trademark infringement with re~
spect to the mark TOTALLY RAD SUPER SOAKER to be used in con~
nection with water guns. 190 In part, TTMP claimed priority based on
the ITU application it had filed on July 31, 1990, prior to Larami's
alleged first actual use on August 24, 1990. 191 Like the applicant in
Zirco, TTMP claimed that it could rely on the constructive use provi
sion even though its mark was not yet registered. 192 The district court
disagreed, concluding that until TTMP's mark was registered, it could
not rely on Section 7(c) to establish priority of use over Larami. 193
The court relied on the express language of Section 7(c) which made
constructive use "contingent upon registration," finding that language
unambiguous and observing that "[iJf Congress intended for con
structive use to apply to a dispute like the <;ase at bar, but drafted the
statute carelessly, Congress can redraft it."194 Unlike the Board, the
court was not persuaded by the legislative history or the argument that
such an interpretation would defeat the goals of the TLRA with re
spect to ITU applications: "The central purpose of [Section 7(c)J-to
foster intent-to-use applications-remains intact. An applicant obtains
the advantages of constructive use. He just does not gain that advan
tage until his mark is registered."195
The court recognized that the Board had reached a different re
sult in Zirco, but found the two results reconcilable based on the differ
ent procedural contexts in which the issues had arisen: an opposition
proceeding in Zirco and a summary judgment motion in a trademark
majority of junior users, upon learning of a conflicting prior lTV application, will drop
their activities under the disputed mark ... ." Id. at § 19:64. McCarthy, however, went on to
note that since the lTV registrant will not be able to obtain injunctive relief without prov
ing likelihood of confusion, a court might consider that post filingjunior user's investment
and use of a mark in weighing the factors for determining injunctive relief, thus adding to
the lTV applicant's uncertainty. Id. at §§ 19:65, 19:67. See also Jones, supra note 44, at
167-77 (lTV applicants are left with inadequate remedies against infringing conduct oc
curring after the filing date but prior to registration).
189. 804 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
190. See id. at 556.
191. See id. at 557.
192. See id. at 558.
193. See id. at 561.
194. Id. at 560.
195. Id.
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infringement action in the case before it. 196 Whereas the party in Zirco
was relying on Section 7(c) to protect itself against one trying to de
feat its application, the plaintiff in Laramiwas relying on Section 7(c)
to obtain affirmative relief against a purported infringer.197
The Trademark Board itself had an opportunity to revisit this is
sue when it decided the case involving Larami's opposition to TTMP's
trademark application,198 a case it did not decide until after the dis
trict court's decision described above. The Board affirmed the ap
proach it had taken in Zirco, allowing TTMP to rely on its constructive
use date to establish priority of use and agreed with the district court
that the procedural context made the two outcomes reconcilable. 199 It
stated:
In a proceeding before the Board, whose jurisdiction is limited
solely to the registration of the party's mark, it would defeat the
purpose of filing an intent-to-use application if an applicant were
not able to rely upon its constructive use date in defending its right
to registration .... On the other hand, in a civil action involving a
party's right to use a mark, such as ITMP's infringement action, it
would not be equitable for an intent-to-use applicant to be entitled
to rely upon a constructive use date prior to registration of its
mark, and thus potentially prior to any use whatsoever, to defeat
the common law rights of a first actual user of its mark.2oo

The Board further noted that it would also allow an opposer to
rely on Section 7 (c) to establish priority if it had the first filed applica
tion for registration. "[I]n proceedings before the Board the construc
tive use provisions of Section 7(c) may be used both defensively and
offensively."20I Thus, Section 7(c) has different meanings depending
on the procedural context in which its application arises.
To complicate the situation further, a third twist on this scenario
was presented in Warneroision Entertainment v. Empire of Carolina. 202 In
that case plaintiffWarnervision filed an action and obtained a prelimi
nary injunction against Empire, claiming infringement of its trade
mark REAL WHEELS.203 Empire had relied on its predecessor-in
196. See id.
197. See id. Accord, Fila Sport S.p.A. v. Diadora America, 141 F.R.D. 74 (N.D. III. 1991).
See 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 19:26 (concluding that legislative history would not
support injunctive relief in favor of an lTV applicant prior to registration).
198. See Larami Corp. v. Talk to Me Programs, Inc., 36 V.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840
(T.T.A.B. 1995).
199. See id. at 1845.
200. [d. at 1845.
201. [d. at 1845 n.7.
202. 101 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1996).
203. See id.
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interest's filing of an lTD application on September 9, 1994, to estab
lish priority and to protect itself against the preliminary injunction.
The district court had granted the injunction in Warnervision's favor
on the basis of its actual use of the mark and had refused to allow
Empire to rely on Section 7(c) prior to registration of the mark. 204 On
appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court had mis
applied Section 7(c) and thus had abused its discretion in granting
Warnervision injunctive relief. 205 Mter observing that Empire was not
seeking "affirmative or offensive relief' against Warnervision, but
rather was simply asserting Section 7(c) as "a defense to Warnervi
sion's efforts to prevent it from completing the lTV registration pro
cess,"206 the court, citing the Trademark Board's decisions in Zirco and
Lammi, concluded that to deny Empire the protection of Section 7 (c)
would defeat the purposes of the intent-ta-use legislation. It stated:
The lTV provisions permit the holder of an ITU application to use
the mark in commerce, obtain registration, and thereby secure pri
ority retroactive to the date of filing the lTV application. Of course
this right or privilege is not indefinite; it endures only for the time
allotted by the statute. But as long as an lTV applicant's privilege
has not expired, a court may not enjoin it from making the use
necessary for registration on the grounds that another party has
used the mark subsequent to the filing of the ITU application. To
permit such an injunction would eviscerate the lTV provisions and
defeat their very purpose. 207

Reading the Lammi court decision and Warnervision together, it
seems then that although an ITV applicant cannot use Section 7(c)
affirmatively in its infringement action against an alleged infringer
before registration, it can use it to defend against injunctive relief if
sued by another for trademark infringement. Section 7(c) seems to
have been interpreted by the courts as applying only defensively to
lTV applicants and not offensively, even though there is nothing in its
language or the legislative history to support such a distinction. The
Trademark Board is not as restrictive in its application of Section 7 (c) ,
allowing it to be used both defensively and offensively in opposition
proceedings. Even at the Trademark Board, however, no final judg
ment in favor of a party can be issued until its mark is registered.
204. See id. at 26l.
205. See id. at 262.
206. [d. at 261.
207. [d. at 262. Cf Windows User, Inc. v. Reed Bus. Publ'g. Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (where notice of allowance refused based on descriptive nature of mark,
ITU applicant could not use its filing date to establish priority over defendant).
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Thus, a party filing an lTV application has rights that are some
what unclear. Even at the Board, nothing is truly final until registra
tion, and in the courts, the applicant may only be able to rely on
constructive use defensively and not to assert rights against another.
This patchwork of interpretations renders the value of Section 7(c)
and constructive use somewhat questionable.
B.

The Two-Step Process: When and How Issues Regarding
Registrability Are Raised in the lTV Process

In addition to the unsettled value of constructive use, the lTV
applicant faces a complex task of determining when and how issues
regarding the registrability of the mark can be raised during the lTV
process. As described above,208 the lTV application process follows
several steps. The application is examined initially by the PTO, and a
notice of allowance is issued unless the mark is found ineligible for
protection or is successfully opposed. 20 9 The applicant thereafter must
file within the designated time period a statement of use demonstrat
ing that the mark has actually been used in commerce. 210 At this sec
ond stage, the PTO engages in a second examination of the mark's
registrability before issuing a registration. 211 Many questions have
arisen about what issues can be raised at that second examination.
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prod
ucts CO.,212 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue.
Bell & Howell had filed an lTV application for the marks "6200,"
"6800," and "8100" for microfilm reader/printers. The marks were
published for the opposition, and Kodak filed a notice of opposition
against the marks, claiming that the marks would be used as model
designators and thus would be merely descriptive and ineligible for
protection without secondary meaning in accordance with Section
2(e) of the Trademark Act. 213 The Board dismissed the opposition,
ruling that since the marks had not yet been used, the issue of descrip
tiveness could not be determined at that time. 214 A notice of allow
ance was thus issued in Bell & Howell's favor. 215 Kodak appealed the
Board's decision, arguing that the Board had improperly created an
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See supra
See id.
See id.
See id.
994 F.2d
See id. at
See id. at
See id.

text accompanying notes 45-55.

1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1570.
1571.
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implied presumption that numerical marks were not merely descrip
tive and that the creation of that presumption was not a reasonable
interpretation of the Board's authority under the Trademark Act. 216
The Federal Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the TLRA
and concluded that "Congress intended most marks applied for in an
intent-to-use application ... [would] be reviewed for descriptiveness
in the initial examination/pre-use stage of the intent-to-use applica
tion process."217 It further found that Congress intended that the sec
ond examination at the statement of use stage would be for issues that
"could not have been fully considered during the initial examination
of the application . . . ."218 As the Senate Report on the TLRA de
scribed, the second examination was to be limited to issues such as:
Whether the person filing the statement of use is the applicant,
whether the mark as used corresponds to the drawing submitted
with the application, whether the goods or services were identified
in the application and not subsequently deleted, and whether the
mark, as displayed in the specimens or facsimiles, functions as a mark. 219

Thus, Congress did foresee that some issues, including the ability
of the mark to function as a mark, could not be fully evaluated at the
initial, pre-use examination.
The court concluded that the Board was reasonable in deferring
full consideration of the descriptiveness of Bell & Howell's marks until
the second, post-use examination. 220 It reasoned that although the
Board could find certain·marks to be prima facie merely descriptive at
the initial examination, for other marks it would not be so clear.221
Even in those cases, however, passing the initial examination did not
mean that the mark would automatically be registered since it would
be re-examined at the post-use stage. 222
The court cited several PTO regulations regarding that post-use
examination and the standard to be used for determining which is
sues could be raised at this second inquiry.223 The court also relied on
Trademark Examination Guide 3-89, which provides that the PTO "will
not issue any requirements or refusals ... [when examining the state
216. See id. at 1570-72.
217. Id. at 1572.
218. Id. at 1572 (quoting S. REp No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1988), reprinted in
1988 V.S.C.CAN. 5577, 5596).
219. S. REp. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1988), reprinted in 1988 V.S.C.CAN.
5577, 5596 (emphasis added).
220. See ~astrnan Kodak Co., 994 F.2d at 1571.
221. See id. at 1572.
222. Id. at 1572-73.
223. See id. at 1573.
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ment of use] which could have or should have been raised during the
initial examination, unless the failure to do so in initial examination
constitutes a clear error."224 "Clear error" was defined as "an error
which, if not corrected, would result in issuance of a registration in
violation of the [Trademark] Act."225 Moreover, the Trademark Exami
nation Guide provides a specific standard with respect to re-examina
tion for alleged mere descriptiveness: "[T] he examining attorney may
not issue a refusal [on the grounds of mere descriptiveness] ... unless
the refusal is dictated by changed circumstances from the time of the
initial examination or the failure to issue such a refusal would consti
tute clear error."226
In spite of this demanding standard limiting the bases for refusal
at the second examination stage, the court concluded that the Board
could re-examine Bell & Howell's marks for descriptiveness at the
post-use stage, reas~ning that such use itself might be considered
"changed circumstances" and that without actual use, the PTO could
not determine the descriptiveness of numerical marks. 227 Kodak ar
gued that this deferral of the determination of descriptiveness was
prejudicial to its interests and that it created a different standard for
lTV marks than that used for use-based applications. 228 The Court
rejected both arguments, resting in large part on the fact that this two
step process was what Congress had intended by enacting the
TLRA.229
In In re Parfums Schiaparelli,230 the Trademark Board shed more
light on this issue. The applicant had filed an lTV application for the
mark SCHIAPARELLI for fragrances; the applicant owned a registra
tion for the same mark for related goods and claimed distinctiveness
of the mark on the basis of this prior registration. 23 I No opposition
was filed, the notice of allowance issued, and on January 24, 1994, the
applicant submitted its statement of use and three specimens of
use. 232 At the post-use examination of this statement of use, the exam
ining attorney refused registration, finding clear error in the earlier
224.

t:'astman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1573 (quoting TRADEMARK EXAMINATION GUIDE 3-89

§ A-9(b)).
225. Id.
226. Id. See also 3 McCARTHY, supra note 17, at §§ 19:22-19:24.
227. See id.
228. See Eastman Kodak Co., 994 F.2d at 1573.
229. See id. at 1573-76. See Easunan Kodak v. Bell & Howell: A Reaffirmation of the "Rea
sonableness" Standard, 10 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH LJ. 251 (1994).
230. 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1864 (T.T.A.B. 1995).
231. See id. at 1865.
232. See id.
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approval on the grounds that applicant's mark was likely to cause con
fusion with another previously registered mark owned by a third
party.233 In response, the applicant argued that its use of the mark
under its earlier registration had long co-existed with the other party's
use of its registered mark on different goods and that therefore there
had been no clear error at the initial examination with respect to like
lihood of confusion. 234
The Board reviewed the standard for clear error and the legisla
tive history regarding the scope of the second examination described
in Bell & Howell as well as the additional history which indicated that
the examinations of the statements of use could also include an exam
ination of the factors set forth in Sections 2(a) through 2(e), which
.includes likelihood of confusion with a pre-existing mark. 235 Re-exam
ination on the basis of these provisions, however, was intended to be
quite limited, that is, "for purposes of considering issues that could
not have been addressed before the notice of allowance was issued
and use was initiated."236 Given the narrow scope allowed for the post
use review, the Board agreed with the applicant that the issuing of the
notice of allowance was not clear error, even though there was con
flicting evidence with respect to the likelihood of confusion. There
fore the Board reversed the second examiner's refusal to register
applicant's mark. 237
Given the Board's stringent interpretation of what will constitute
"clear error," Kodak's concerns may not have been groundless. If the
PTO and the Board are disinclined to re-examine for issues such as
descriptiveness or likely confusion at the post-use examination, and
initial examiners are willing to defer such issues to that later stage as
in Kodak, lTV applicants may be able to obtain registration without a
thorough review of the issues at either stage.
The matter is further complicated by the Board's treatment of
analogous issues in the context of a cancellation petition. In Salacuse
233. See id. at 1865-66.
234. See id. at 1866.
235. See id. at 1868-69.
236. Id. at 1869 n.22 (quoting United States Trademark Association, The Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988,344 (1989». The Board recounted in detail the legislative his
tory of these sections, pointing out that the House had amended the original Senate bill to
expand the scope of the statement of use examination to include the factors set forth in
Sections 2(a) through (e) of the Lanham Act. In the subsequent Senate debate on the
change, Senator DeConcini expressed the Senate's desire to provide applicants with suffi
cient certainty once they had received the notice of allowance and opined that the second
examination should be very limited in its scope, even with the House amendments. Id.
237. See id. at 1868.
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v. Ginger SPirits,23B Salacuse petitioned to cancel Ginger Spirits's regis
tration for the mark SOVTH BEACH BEER for use in connection
with sales of beer.239 Ginger Spirits had filed an ITV application three
months after Salacuse had filed two lTV applications for SOUTH
BEACH in connection with various goods including beer. 240 Although
Salacuse's applications had been filed first, the PTO granted a notice
of allowance to Ginger Spirits. 241 Mter filing its statement of use, Gin
ger Spirits was awarded registration of the mark.242 While Salacuse's
applications were still pending, Salacuse received a notice of allow
ance for one of its applications whereas the other was refused on the
basis of Ginger Spirits's registration. 243
Salacuse based its petition to cancel Ginger Spirits's registrations
on priority of use and likelihood of confusion, arguing that since his
applications were filed first, he had the earlier constructive use date
and thus priority.244 In response, Ginger Spirits argued in part that
Salacuse's ITU applications were invalid because Salacuse had lacked
a bona fide intention to use the marks. 245 Salacuse moved for sum
mary judgment, arguing that the validity of his lTV applications could
not be raised in this proceeding where Ginger Spirits's registration
was at issue and not Salacuse's trademark applications. Ginger Spirits
responded that to deny it the opportunity to challenge Salacuse's ap
plications would be inequitable, given that Salacuse was relying on
those very applications to establish priority of use. 246 The Board
agreed with Ginger Spirits that Salacuse's applications were not im
mune to challenge where Salacuse was relying on their validity as the
basis of his cancellation petition. 247 The Board reasoned,
[Salacuse's] constructive use priority is contingent upon the matur
ing of his prior-filed applications into registrations .... In view of
. . . [Ginger Spirits's] pleaded challenge to the validity of . . .
[Salacuse's] applications, and because ... [Salacuse] bears the ulti
mate burden of proof on the priority issue, it is not inequitable to
require [Salacuse] to go beyond the mere pendency of ... [his]
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415 (T.T.A.B. 1997).
See id. at ]416-17.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1416.
See id. at 1416 n.l.
See id. at 1416-17.
See id. at ] 417.
See id. at 1418.
See id.
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applications and establish his entitlement to the registrations upon
which his priority claim is based. 248

Because the issue of Salacuse's bona fide intention to use was a ques
tion of fact, the Board denied Salacuse's motion for summary judg
ment. 249 The Board recognized that this conclusion raised several
procedural issues not specifically addressed in the statute. 250 Ginger
Spirits could not file a counterclaim against Salacuse to "cancel" his
lTV applications because the Board did not have jurisdiction over
those applications in the proceedings to cancel the Ginger Spirits's
registration. 251 Ginger Spirits could only raise the issue by way of an
affirmative defense. Thus, if after trial Salacuse was found to have
lacked a bona fide intention to use the mark, that finding would be
sufficient to protect Ginger Spirits against the priority claim, and
Salacuse's cancellation petition would be denied. As the Board ob
served, in such a case Ginger Spirits'S registration would act as a bar to
Salacuse's lTV applications, and even if such applications were to ma
ture to registration, that registration would be subject to cancellation
on the basis of Ginger Spirits'S own registration. 252 The Board further
observed that if, on the other hand, Salacuse withstood the challenge
to his applications, he would still not be entitled to any final relief
against Ginger Spirits unless and until his applications matured into
registrations. 253
This case illustrates several procedural problems created by the
TLRA and the lTV regime. First, there is the lack of any mechanism
for a counterclaim against a petitioner who relies onhis application to
establish priority, resulting in duplicative proceedings and incomplete
resolutions. Second, there is the previously noted problem of lack of
finality until registrations issue, leaving the various parties unclear as
to their rights. Moreover, tile case indicates that there is some confu
sion at the PTO regarding the treatment of lTV applications. 254
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See id. at 1419.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 1420.
253. See id. at 1418-19 n.8.
254. In a footnote discussing one of Salacuse's ITU applications, the Board gave the
following description of the status of that application:
Although the parties have referred to application Serial No. 74/370,621 as having
been abandoned, it appears from the Office's records that the application is still
pending. A notice of allowance originally was issued with respect to the applica
tion on February 22, 1994, but that notice of allowance apparently was cancelled
on August 22, 1994. Despite the cancellation of the notice of allowance, several
requests to extend time to file a statement of use were filed by petitioner and
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The case also illustrates that although the Board may not ques
tion some issues resolved at the initial examination of the ITU applica
tion, such issues may be raised anew by other parties, either by way of
an affirmative defense or by a petition to cancel a mark once it is
registered.

IV.

Have the Objectives of the Intent to Use Legislation
Been Achieved?

As discussed above, Congress had several justifications for amend
ing the trademark laws in 1988 to allow applicants to file for trade
mark registration on the basis of their intent to use the mark as
opposed to actual use of the mark in commerce. In part, Congress
wanted to eliminate the disadvantages that the use requirement im
posed on American businesses as compared to foreign trademark ap
plicants who could obtain a United States registration without use of
the mark by relying on their home country registration. Congress
wanted to provide American businesses with a more certain and effi
cient way of ensuring protection of trademark without relying on the
"sham" of token use. Thus, certainty and predictability were key goals
of the ITU scheme embodied in the TLRA.255
How effective has the legislation proved to be in accomplishing
those goals? Although there are undoubtedly some advantages for
those who can now file applications on the basis of intent to use and
who face no challenges to those applications, for those who anticipate
or experience such challenges, there is at least as much uncertainty
and perhaps more than there had been prior to the enactment of the
TLRA.
First of all, the TLRA did not eliminate the ambiguities involved
in defining what will constitute "first use" for purposes of determining
priority as between two claimants to a mark. Courts continue to apply
differing tests to determine whether a claimant has engaged in suffi
cient activity to claim priority. The vagueness of the "use analogous to
trademark use" doctrine has only been exacerbated by the need to
approved by the Office. It is unclear from the record why the notice of allowance
was cancelled, or why the extension requests were filed and approved after can
cellation of the Notice of Allowance. In any event, a second notice of allowance
appears to have been issued on April 8, 1997, to which petitioner's first response,
i.e., a statement of use or a request to extend time to file a statement of use, is due
on October 8, 1997.
Id. at 1416 n.1.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
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modifY the doctrine in cases where an application has been made
under the intent to use section. 256
In addition, the TLRA has added new burdens for those who ap
ply under the lTV section. A party who files an opposition to such an
application arguing that the applicant lacks a bona fide intent to use
seems to have a fairly easy means of forcing a full factual determina
tion on that question, given the reluctance of the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board to grant summary judgment to applicants on that
issue. The standard of proof is so unclear that parties trying to estab
lish their bona fide intent to use will face considerable uncertainty
and delay in the processing of the lTV applications. 257
Moreover, the lTV applicant still needs to prove actual use before
registration of the trademark will be granted. As the cases indicate,
the Board has taken a very strict approach to evaluating the state
ments of use filed by lTV applicants. Thus, again the lTV applicant
faces uncertainty; even after it has obtained a notice of allowance, it
cannot be confident of its ability to obtain registration in the long run
without proving "use" under a demanding test.258
This uncertainty is compounded when one considers the other
problems faced by the lTV applicant. Although its notice of allowance
will provide it with priority based on the constructive use provision in
an opposition proceeding, the notice will not provide it with the abil
ity to obtain affirmative relief in federal court against an infringer un
less and until the mark has been registered. 259 The lTV applicant also
faces some uncertainty with respect to the determination of its mark's
eligibility for registration. The statute allows for two different opportu
nities for the Board to determine the mark's suitability for registra
tion: once during the pre-use notice of allowance stage and a second
during the post-use registration stage. The cases indicate that while
the second examination is intended to be quite limited in scope, the
Board may defer some determinations of eligibility, for example, de
terminations of the descriptiveness of the mark, until that second ex
amination. Thus, the lTV applicant may find that its hopes for
registration based on the notice of allowance were unfounded. 260
What does this all add up to for those who wish to rely on the lTV
application process? For some lTV applicants, and those seeking to
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See
See
See
See
See
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supra
supra
supra

text
text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
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notes
notes
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93-153.
63-192.
155-70.
174-207.
208-54.
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challenge them, it would seem that there will be increased confusion
and uncertainty. Thus, it may be that Congress failed to achieve one
of the key objectives of the TLRA: increased certainty and predictabil
ity for American businesses.

Conclusion: Congress Should Re-evaluate and Amend the lTV
Provisions of the TLRA
Senator DeConcini, in his remarks on the bill that became the
TLRA, stated that if certain provisions of that bill "serve to reduce the
certainty the intent-to-use system is meant to provide, or prove bur
densome to either applicants or the PTO, Congress should expedi
tiously consider revising the system so it can meet its stated
objectives."261 As it is now more than ten years since the lTV system
was instituted, it would appear that it is time for Congress to conduct
its own evaluation of the system to see whether it is meeting its objec
tives or whether that system should be revised.
Although Congress would not and should ,not turn back the clock
and eliminate intent to use as a basis for trademark application, it
should consider taking some steps to reduce some of the uncertainties
described above. For example, perhaps it is now time to jump off the
fence Congress has been straddling since 1988 and allow for registra
tion before actual use of the mark, as is done in many foreign na
tions. 262 A party could still forfeit that registration for failure to use
after a specified period of time, if so challenged by another user, but
until such a challenge, the party would have all the rights of a trade
mark registrant as provided by the Lanham Act. Such a change would
eliminate the need for the evaluation of the applicant's statement of
use and for the second examination of the mark itself.
Congress should also consider statutorily eliminating or limiting
the "use analogous to trademark use" doctrine, which allows one to
oppose a registration based not on actual use before the application,
but only on "use analogous" to such use. Perhaps it would make more
sense to create a system where the first to file has priority, regardless
of any promotional or other activities of another.
261. Congo Rec. S16973 (October 20, 1988 daily ed.) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
262. See generally CandidaJohnson and Robert Baugh, The Enforcement of Trade Mark
Rights in Europe (1999). See also Alejandro Guanes-Mersan, A General Comparative Overview
of Trademark Regulations Between the United States and Paraguay, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & COMPo
LAw 775, 789-90, 793 (1999); Shilpa Mehta and Leslie Steele Smith, An American Practi
tioner's Guide to the Developing System of Trademark Law Within the EurojJean Union, 3 TEX.
INTELL. PRop.LJ. 85,95,98-99 (1995).
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Finally, Congress should consider providing some way in which
an lTV applicant can establish its bona fide intention to use so that it
will not be subject to easy challenges by opposers looking for a way to
delay the lTV process. For example, Congress could impose on an
opposer the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the applicant,
rather than forcing the applicant to prove its own good faith.
The TLRA was an important change in American trademark law
and one that has been generally viewed as a major benefit to Ameri
can trademark owners. It is not without its flaws, however, and some
steps should be taken to improve the lTV system so that it better ac
complishes Congress's intended objective of reducing uncertainty for
American trademark owners.
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